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RightPRELIMINARY CONCEPTS FOR ECONOMIC SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
YOSHIRO KAMITAKE
Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University




In preparing theoretical tools to analyze economic systems we need several fundamental
concepts that are often applied in various scientiﬁc investigations outside economic studies.
Amongst others, the concept of autopoiesis, which was introduced by Niklas Luhmann into his
sociological systems theory, is the most important in constructing a theoretical model to explain
the working of economic systems. An autopoietic system may be regarded as the functional
core by which other elementary concepts such as homeostasis, machinery, corporate system and
social entropy can be logically connected.
In conclusion, all economic systems are contained in distinct social systems of autopoietic
character and incorporated with them as a subsystem or partially independent system.
Keywords: system, autopoiesis
JFL Classiﬁcation: B00, B41
Since the 1970s the sociological importance of the system concept based on general
systems theory has been emphasized in the reconstruction of fundamental methodological
concepts such as ʻstructureʼ and ʻfunctionʼ, and consequently several signiﬁcant issues
concerning its application to social sciences have been raised by sociologists and social
philosophers.
1 Amongst others, Niklas Luhmann, a German sociologist and philosopher,
constructed a far-reaching framework of social systems theory.
2 In the present article, we apply
his social systems theory to the sphere of economic systems. Our aim is to universalize and
formalize the perspective of social systems theory, and then to redeﬁne the concept of system
so that it is eﬃciently applicable to any economic systems analysis. As a result, we propose a
new socioeconomic or metaeconomic view for interpreting all economic phenomena.
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics 49 (2008), pp.133-147. Ⓒ Hitotsubashi University
1 See, ʻEinleitungʼ in Bühl (1975).
2 We refer to his article (ʻFunktionale Methode und Systemtheorieʼ in Bühl (1975)) and his two great books
(Luhmann (1984) and (1988)).I
The process of creating an image of a structure involves transforming the initial object of
thought to another object through the ﬁeld in which we are constantly operating our thinking
apparatus. Professional mathematicians recognize this process to be an operation in a ʻcategoryʼ
that is a collection of objects and morphisms or an axiomatic schema of sets and mappings.
More generally, it is a process of forming an imaginative relationship among objects of
intellectual speculation. Jean Piaget, a Swiss psychologist, called its product a ʻconstructive
structureʼ that is characterized by the criteria: ʻtotalityʼ, ʻtransformationʼ and ʻself-regulationʼ.
3 On
this occasion it must be noted that the existence of a ʻconstructingʼ structure precedes that of a
ʻconstructedʼ structure, since the latter cannot be considered as an a priori object of thinking as
in the epistemology of naïve realism.
On the other hand, the same process is also able to be conceptualized formally. It seems
that the word ʻsystemʼ is entirely appropriate for it. If we regard any apparatus of operation in
general as an operator irrespective of whether it is worked by human beings or physical
machines, and consider the initial object that is worked on by the operator and the ﬁnal object
produced by it as input and output, we can represent the ʻconstructive structureʼ by the
ʻinput/output schemaʼ
4 which is logically equivalent to the structure of mathematical ʻcategoryʼ.
Particularly in view of the fact that Piaget emphasizes the importance of ʻself-regulationʼ in the
notion of structure, the extended concept of system with feedback and feed-forward may be
more suitable for our intended purpose. Therefore we remark on some elementary points
concerning the concept of operation.
First, we introduce several terms in relation to feedback control. A set of governors, each
of which forms an individual system, may belong to the̶usually, multi-level̶control sphere
that operates on the real sphere where there is a vertical or hierarchical relationship among
functionally diﬀerent systems. Then we add a brief explanation of the term feed-forward
control, which is closely related to feedback systems. It is a control that can be operated in the
time-pass between the initial input and the ﬁnal output within a certain complex system. Its
marked characteristic may be revealed in the function of cutting oﬀ some external disturbances
or inﬂuences of outside systems. The concept of feed-forward seems to play a crucial role in
the functional analysis of social organizations. In particular, we take note of negative feed-
forward, which controls information oppressively in the time-pass between input and output.
Examples include the restraint of human behavior by a rumor or canard, the self-imposed
control of low-level government clerks against an order by a senior oﬃcer, the suspension of
speculative activity under a pessimistic prediction etc. Moreover, feed-forward control is
especially signiﬁcant in the case of a game-like situation, since it includes an element of social
or mutual prediction as an indispensable part. Its predictiveness may be derived from the
reﬂective process that is initiated in view of the consequence of feedback control. If we drive a
car without feed-forward control and put on the brakes after a car crash, we may be killed in
the accident.
Apart from the descriptive or technical aspects of the system concept, we examine its more
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3 See, Piaget (1968).
4 Luhmann (1984), S.24.formal and theoretical structure, which may be symbolically called the ʻinput/output schemaʼ.
Structure is formally composed of a collection or a set of symbols or elements and one or more
ﬁxed relations among them. Structure itself is independent from any space-time constraints,
since it has no temporal or spatial character. In a more metaphysical expression structure is
static, while system is dynamic. But the latter must be deﬁned more strictly. The concept of
system is subordinate to that of structure. System is a certain kind of structure that includes a
temporal order, and therefore it is a moving, continuous and sometimes inﬁnite structure. The
above expression ʻinput/output schemaʼ or more precisely ʻinput/operator/output schemaʼ may be
convenient for elucidating such a deﬁnition. Accordingly a feedback system performs the
function of inverting the temporal order and maintaining the partial reversibility of the system
as a whole. If we adapt the concept of system to a logical framework of mathematical
ʻcategoryʼ theory to be given later, the notion of input and output may become an eﬃcient
means for understanding the connection and separation between system and environment. Since
the system is structure in motion, no system can exist as such when it stops motion and then it
is to be reduced to a structure. For the description of motion as an essential element of system
the expression ʻself-referenceʼ has often been used in social systems theory. It is a momentum
or ʻprincipleʼ to preserve the unity of a certain system. As is mentioned later, self-reference is
the logical starting point from which an autopoietic system can be derived.
If we assign input, output and operator to domain, codomain and morphism in category
theory, we can combine these sets to specify what Luhmann called the ʻsystem/environment
diﬀerenceʼ.
5 When it is supposed that domain equals codomain, all elements of system shall
belong to the same environment where the motion of system continues repeatedly and its
openness, closeness and recursiveness may appear. It should be noted that ʻenvironmentʼ is
sometimes replaced below by ʻﬁeldʼ which is synonymous with it.
In consideration of the above terminology we examine a more concrete meaning of system
in some cases of the observation of physical and social phenomena. Of course, no society can
be regarded as a set of homogenous physical particles as in the quantum ﬁeld. What is the
diﬀerence between social and physical objects of observation?
Any individual person as a social ʻparticleʼ may have consciousness and create an image or
a mental structure that is formally constructed by his morphism. A human action composed of
several ʻconstructive structuresʼ and mutually exchanging morphisms cannot be found in the
motion of physical particles. Moreover, anyone can select and determine to specify morphism,
and consequently recognize that there is a certain type of morphism (ʻfunctionʼ) between
physical objects. Such mental activity of mankind may be called observation, which is a ﬁnite
action that produces a tangible image of external phenomena. However, human beings cannot
observe all objects of the phenomenal world. For example, we have no apparatus of observation
for looking at the motion of particles in an eight-dimensional space. As a result we are faced
with the limited choice between the recognition of the actual existence of a particle through its
projected image in a four-dimensional space and the observation of an imperceptible object
with its formal image such as a hyper surface represented by an abstract system of equations.
In physics, a certain pattern of interaction among particles has been grasped by the method
of Hartree-Fock approximation. But it is much more diﬃcult in social sciences to frame a law
that adequately explains a mechanism of social interaction, since everyone is directly or
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5 Ibid, S.25.indirectly inﬂuenced by other peopleʼs constructions, choices and determinations of morphisms
for their own behaviors. Therefore, most social scientists assume that everyone is more or less
alienated from society, which is principally based on the reiﬁcation of social relationships, and
build up a virtual image of society without human free will, where human communication takes
place as if it were a physical phenomenon. On the other hand, the social systems theory
elaborated by Luhmann constructs an image of society with free will. He supports his theory
with two basic concepts: problem-solving and environment. We next consider his theoretical
framework and explore its implications.
II
Here, we begin to disclose the structure of the problem. It may be suitable for an
application of the system concept, since it is supposed to have a solution as a complex of
operator and output. As Luhmann points out, the fundamental signiﬁcance of the system is
given by the function of problem-solving
6 . More accurately, the system has a functional
structure in which arbitrary, sometimes mutually inconsistent problems are inputted and their
solutions can be furnished as output through an operator. In this respect the system can be
deﬁned as a continuously moving dynamic structure. Of the several types of system that can be
assumed, the following two examples have some explanatory signiﬁcance.
[1] Problem-solving in mathematics
A diagram of the system can be made to show concrete problem-solving as follows:




a set of solutions (output).
Another diagram of the system in a proof is also drawn:
speciﬁed sequence of symbols (input)
↓
combinations of axioms and theorems (operator)
↓
ﬁnal sequence of symbols (output).
[2] Problem-solving in a criminal trial
In this case we can draw the following diagram with two opposite types of output:
prosecution (input)
↓
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6 Niklas Luhmann, ʻFunktionale Methode und Systemtheorieʼ , in Bühl (1975).presentation of a case compared with structural elements (operator)
↓
the prosecutorʼs recommendation regarding sentencing (output 1)
The traverse of the recommendation (output 2).
Then the succeeding system works as follows:
input (output 1 and 2)
↓
consultation between judges (operator)
↓
the sentence (output)
Of these two cases, the former may be more formal and substantial. Any formal problem-
solving in mathematics is immediately reduced to a substantial one. On the other hand, formal
elements are separated from substantial ones in judicial problem-solving. Linkage between
formal and substantial problem-solving attaches an actual meaning to legal judgments, since
any formal problem-solving without a substantial one becomes meaningless in court. Such a
ʻlinkage-viewpoint (Bezugsgesichtspunkt)
7 ʼ of legal semantics enhances the substantiality of
problem-solving in judicial decisions.
However, the formalization of social semantics that depends on a communicative structure
of society may make any substantial problem-solving insuﬃcient. If our social communications
become diverse and isolated, we can only achieve a dry and mechanical problem-solving with
no humane sensibility. A formal, but insubstantial problem-solving may be said to be a freeze
on a problem. It is logically equivalent to a stop to operations in a machinery system. But it
should be noted that a freeze on a problem can often be regarded as a ʻsolutionʼ.T h e nw ec a n
suppose the third case that there exists no solution both formally and substantially. This means
elimination of the problem or extinction of the operator. While putting oﬀ discussing this case,
we next trace the relationship between problem-solving and a freeze on problems.
We can explain the moving pattern of a social system through a ʻproblemʼ by comparing
two types of social relation or organization. For example, there may be various conﬂicts in the
relationship between husband and wife. The relationship is based on sexual relations that are
common to all living creatures. However the uniqueness of the relationship is that each member
of the couple freely exchanges a vivid and unabridged imagination with the other to maintain
the relationship through problem-solving. This system is not working if the number of unsolved
problems that are decisive for the couple mounts progressively, and sometimes breaks down.
Then the couple gets divorced. But even if divorce is avoided and the marriage continues, the
marital relation cannot exist forever, since both partners will ultimately die. On the contrary,
there is another type of social system that remains logically in perpetuity. For example, a joint
stock company may have a continuous existence as a legal entity, because it is operated by
shareholders and functional members who are interchangeable and can be recruited irrespective
of the death of individual persons. The fate of a joint stock company as a system is mainly
decided by the cumulative eﬀects of a freeze on problems. For instance, any corporate failure
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7 Ibid., S.121.owing to an accumulated debt (ʻproblemʼ) may endanger the existence of a joint stock
organization. Such an organization seems to be a representative type of social system. Therefore
a family has more points of resemblance than a couple to a joint stock company. But it should
be remembered that any actual social system may admit a freeze on a problem to be another
ʻsolutionʼ and that it can preserve itself with inherent logical contradictions. Luhmann asserts
that:
Such a strictly logical or dialectical contradiction as ʻA=not Aʼ does not come under
discussion. It makes any simultaneous solution of diﬀerent problems impossible. However
a proposition of functionalism suggests that any social system can continue to survive in
spite of the existence of various contradictions.
8
Now we must take account of another factor that governs the persistence of a social
system. It may be called the environment or ﬁeld. If we consider a social system instead of a
system in general, we cannot treat it by itself (an sich), since it is inseparable from its
environment, which can be another system or a set of diﬀerent static structures. Luhmann
contrived to combine a social system with its environment, and constructed the ʻsystem/environ-
ment theory
9ʼ. If a system is considered from such a methodological perspective, its motion can
be considered to be a persistent, self-sustaining one, which Norbert Wiener called
homeostasis
10. He referred to the concept mainly through the connection between the feedback
principle and physiology, but did not argue generally for its relation to systems theory. In this
regard Luhmann conducted a closer analysis. He commented that ʻany organic body carries out
a compensational, alternative, suppressive or complementary operation on environmental
conditions and events in some eﬀective form, and preserves its own structure.
11ʼ In other words,
a system in general has a function of self-preservation that can maintain its resuscitative ability
including adaptability to changing environments. This function may be called homeostasis in a
strict sense. We classify several types of homeostasis according to the mode of social existence
of human beings.
Mankind may be regarded as a social system and at the same time as an environment,
since a ʻsocial system is not composed of human beings themselves, but of their behaviors
operated by mutual expectations
12ʼ, while a collection of individuals forms a certain social
system. In such dual circumstances three types of homeostasis can be identiﬁed:
(1) social homeostasis corresponding to the self-preservation of a social system,
(2) individual homeostasis corresponding to the self-preservation of man as a social being,
(3) unsociable homeostasis corresponding to the self-preservation of an ʻisolated manʼ
(Einzelmensch
13).
An ʻisolated manʼ is an unsociable individual, whereas an individual is a sociable ʻisolated
manʼ. And the term ʻself-preservationʼ implies the autopoiesis of a system, which will be
discussed later. Now if it is supposed that the split between (1) and (3) deepens and (2)
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8 Ibid., S.114.
9 Ibid., S.111.
10 Wiener (1961), pp.114-115.
11 Luhmann, op.cit., S.109.
12 Ibid., S.118.
13 This word was coined by Troeltsch (1922).becomes impossible, the homeostasis of (2) shall deteriorate into that of (3). Then the social
relationship between individuals and the structure of communication among them will be
changed into ones between ʻisolated menʼ. Consequently a new social ﬁeld for communication
may be prepared, where depersonalized and mechanical communication takes place exclusively.
It includes legal, political, economic and social structures of an independent and separated
character, which as a whole construct, as it were, a ʻdiscrete societyʼ. As society demonstrates a
tendency to become a ʻdiscrete societyʼ, individuals and ʻisolated menʼ are prone to break away
from any communication network or to bring about a state of discommunication. Nevertheless
any ʻdiscrete societyʼ will secure its self-preservation by means of a sort of mechanical
rationalization derived from the ʻsystem rationalityʼ. As Luhmann argues, ʻas y s t e mo fb e h a v i o r
exclusively contributes to system rationality in the capacity of the function of potential
persistence of a function, and consequently does not become substitutable
14.
However, even if the concept of homeostasis is indispensable to the understanding of
human society, it is impossible for us to reveal in it the full means of explaining social
phenomena. Moreover, we should not be too hasty in ascribing a social catastrophe to the
qualitative deterioration of homeostasis in a society. Perhaps we had better employ the term
more restrictively with the same meaning as ʻself-organityʼ in sociology. In the next section we
adopt the term autopoiesis instead of homeostasis in order to consider various formal aspects of
a social system from a slightly altered logical perspective.
III
Here we begin by formulating the concept of system in comparison to that of ʻcategoryʼ in
mathematics, and then examine the notion of autopoiesis. Subsequently and lastly, we perform
a systems analysis of several metaeconomic propositions.
If we consider the structure of a system as the ʻinput/output schemaʼ (cf. SectionⅠ), its
most universal form of representation may be reduced to ʻcategoryʼ in a mathematical meaning.
This interpretation must be examined in more detail. First, the correspondence between system










The operator may be regarded as a function or mapping, more generally as a morphism. If we
regard both of domain and codomain as a collection of elements, and operator as the
relationship among them, we can identify system with structure. However, system as a structure
in motion exhibits two remarkable properties; ﬁrst, the continuity that implies synchronic or
reversible iteration, and second, the discontinuity that is represented by irreversible iteration or
diachronic and irreversible process (history!). The simplest expression of the former is a closed
mechanism mentioned below, and the latter may be exempliﬁed by wars, revolutions and other
various structural transformations in history.
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14 Luhmann, op. cit., S.123.Secondly, operator in a mathematical sense has certain fundamental functions such as a
morphism within a category, a ʻfunctorʼ from one category to another or binary relations.
Accordingly there appear many sorts of domain and codomain as input and output, and the
preservation and transformation of input in relation to output is performed continuously in the
form of quantitative extension, homomorphism, mechanism and connection with diﬀerent
operators. Furthermore, it should be noted that a ﬁxed code is indispensable to an operator. It is
a sequence of theoretical symbols that allow us to process (decode) pieces of information as
input and to transmit messages as output. Usually there are several codes in a single operator.
In other words, making a code is the important function of an operator, which may be called
coding. When there are a couple of codes that are mutually inconsistent, a kind of insulator
must be devised to separate them. The production of such an insulator is also a function of an
operator.
Applying the above formal characterization of a system, we can examine an important
concept in social systems theory. Luhmann named it autopoiesis.H ed e ﬁned it as ʻthe
uniﬁcation of reproduction of units
15ʼ. For example, in a system of behavior the motion of a cell
or a macromolecule is not iterated, but behavior itself must be reproduced continuously. This is
an essential feature of an autopoietic system (hereafter called AP system). Luhmann asserts:
In the AP systems theory the highest priority is put on the question how we can make the
closest approach to the events of elements. The kernel of the fundamental problematic may
not be found in the iteration of elements, but in the connectivity of them.
16
Therefore it is supposed that there is a certain temporal order among the elements of that
system, while its characteristics are dependent on the position in the hierarchy where each
element̶for example, cell or behavior̶ranks. The function of an operator in an AP system is
two-fold in terms of category theory; ﬁrst, that of morphism from domain to codomain, and
second, that of morphism from one hierarchy or category to another. The latter is often named
functor.
The most remarkable property of an AP system is that it is a closed self-reference system
that ʻallows each element of it to recur to itself through the medium of the other elementsʼ.
17
But at the same time it is an ʻopen systemʼ,s i n c eʻit can reproduce itself only in a certain
environment or a diﬀerence from itʼ.
18 From a formal point of view, Luhmannʼs concept of
autopoiesis may be similar to that of a clopen set in mathematics. This analogy is deducible
from topology rather than from set theory. In fact, a typical example of clopen set is a subset of
a disconnected topological space. If F1 and F2 are supposed to be two subsets of a disconnected
space (set) F, then the direct sum (⊕) of them can equal F; F=F1⊕F2. Luhmann suggests that
this composition of sets may represent the structure of society that is composed of AP systems
and their environment. We examine further his discussions on an AP system below.
In relation to the notion of communication, he described society as an AP system as
follows:
Any society is an autopoietic system based on meaningful communications. It is composed
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16 Ibid., S.62.
17 Ibid., S.60.
18 Luhmann (1988), S.49.of communication itself, of all possible communications. Everything that constantly arises
in a society is necessarily reduced to the realization and reproduction of itself. Therefore,
communication cannot exist in and with the environment of society. In this respect a
communication system appears as a closed system. However the existence of any society
exclusively depends on certain types of environment, especially on mental consciousness,
organic life, physical phenomena and the evolution of the sun and atoms. Society can
admit such a situation owing to its establishment as an open system. It performs
communication concerning certain objects, that is, society itself, its environment and the
theme of communication that is just being done. In eﬀect, any society is a closed and open
system, and communication is the fundamental form of operation that continuously
reproduces such a dual property of social system.
19
These arguments suggest that any society can be established as a communication system and at
the same time as an autopoietic system when all of the messages with no terminus ad quem are
necessarily combined to form a ﬁxed communication. Since the completeness and sociability of
a system creates its ʻclopenʼ nature and these two properties can be acquired by communication,
the structure of a society is to be reduced to that of communication.
Then it should be noted that in a closed system input and output have been built-in
implicitly. This is the case in a closed mechanism. It is a ringed complex system where the
output in a certain point of time coincides with the next input. Letʼs suppose that two systems













It is clear that the entire system in the diagram is closed completely and that both input and
output are embedded there or out of sight. The system itself appears to be inconsistent with the
ʻinput/output schemaʼ, but its extended form as an open system can be totally preserved in the
input-output relationship with an environment. Then how can it be actualized? From an abstract
and static viewpoint it may be considered to be the result of a combination of two structures.
However, the vital point is whether they can be combined. If a couple of systems can be
combined together, one must be open and the other closed. When both of them are open or
closed, the combination is almost impossible. Generally speaking, any open (closed) system can
exist on the assumption that there is always a closed (open) system annexed to it which is
contained in the environment. The combination of these two distinct and opposite systems may
be called a ʻconnectionʼ. Naturally they can be connected with each other on condition that any
two of them alternately become open and closed. Using mathematical terms, we can express
more clearly such a situation that the so-called ʻconnected spaceʼ is constructed among AP
systems that include ʻsubsetsʼ of environment. For example, an ordinary household system and
the capitalist system can be connected with one another, since the former plays the part of a
microscopic closed system and the latter that of a microscopic or macroscopic open system.
This is a typical relationship between two distinct AP systems, but a peculiar characteristic of
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19 Ibid., S.50.autopoiesis (self-reproduction) can be revealed in the time-pass of a single independent system.
In this case a reproducing (including replicating) process of a system can be represented
by a sequence of inﬁnite compositions of the category 1, which is deﬁn e db yS .M a c L a n ea s
that with one object and one arrow which means endomorphism or automorphism
20. Let an AP
system be represented by a category 1 that is denoted as < ↻ > . Then we have the following
successively reproducing or ʻcreatingʼ(⇒) process;
↻⇒↻⇒↻⇒↻⇒・・・・・・・・・→direction of time.
The formal (algebraic) structure of this diagram can be expressed by an inﬁnite semigroup of
endomorphism whose element is the category 1. We may call this ʻelementʼ an AP system! But,
lastly, it should be noted that every autopoietic system always includes a temporally continuous
element. It makes a temporally continuous sequence of clopen or disconnected sets, whose
structure can be formally represented as that of a certain topological semigroup. In other words,
it shows a continuous, but irreversible character of the metabolically ﬁnite lifetime of all
creatures.
Upon these preliminary investigations we attempt a systems analysis of economic theories.
In this respect Luhmann appropriately remarked as follows:
In so far as various economic sciences are oriented toward the Science, they themselves
become a part of a socially independent autopoietic system. Their basic operation is to
reap the beneﬁt of recognition. They produce recognition out of recognition, and qualify as
recognition what can preserve this quality in a recursive relation to other recognitions.
21
These ʻeconomic sciencesʼ can be regarded as an unstructured set of theoretical systems of
economics that may be called collectively an operator of economic theory (abbreviated below
as OET). Then we can observe the concrete structure of an autopoietic system on which the
OET works.
Initially a group of ʻtheory-producersʼ or economists such as Quesnay, Marx, Leontief,
Sraﬀa and others are inputted in a subsystem of the economic system. Their cogitation becomes
a pillar of the system. They made the most use of ʻmetaphorsʼ (Luhmann) to produce a
theoretical system. The Quesnayʼs Tableau économique, the reproduction schema of Marx and
Leontiefʼs interindustry-relations table are the most representative theoretical systems or models
of economic circulation. They form the category of groups, since their mathematical structure
can be expressed by the concept of group.
22 However there can be another type of theoretical
system with the metaphors of ʻextended productionʼ or ʻgrowthʼ, which can be mathematically
represented by a certain type of semigroup. On this occasion it is considered that a certain
ʻfunctorʼ is operating within the OET. It may be called the ʻaccumulation functorʼ, because it
adds some elements of accumulation in an economic sense to the category of groups. The so-
called ʻregulation theoryʼ
23 seems to have contributed to bringing up the same type of subject
matter as the ʻaccumulation functorʼ, although in a vague and somewhat biased way of
description.
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20 See, MacLane(1998).
21 Ibid., S.75.
22 See, the discussions of Kamitake (2006).
23 For example, see, Boyer (1986).Then what is the output of OET? It may give rise to various types of ideology of
economic policy. For example, we are reminded of some forms of capitalist nationsʼ economic
planning, theory of a socialist planned economy or the economic development theory of a
developing country and so forth. In this respect it should be noted that these forms of ideology
can modify a given economic reality and produce a diﬀerent and virtual one that becomes a
logical ʻmodelʼ of economic theory. In other words, new kinds of economic cogitation are
constructed on the basis of diﬀerent ʻmodelsʼ.T h em e a n i n go fʻmodelʼ can be deﬁned by ʻmodel
theoryʼ in mathematical logic. These ʻmodelsʼ are inputted into economic systems for the
production of OET. As a result, a kind of self-referential̶recursive and impredicative̶con-
struction will continuously emerge and a set of economic ʻmodelsʼ transform itself into an AP
system that creates a ʻneighborhoodʼ or ʻboundaryʼ in the topology-like world of scientists.
IV
Next we must clarify how to establish a distinction and relation between machinery and
system in connection with the existing conditions of human beings. There are two main
problems. First, how can mankind become a main controller of various AP systems by opening
and closing its black box? Second, how can mankind as an AP system control itself? These two
problems are fully, but unsystematically treated below.
We start our discussion about the deﬁnition of human beings and machinery as
controllable systems. From the viewpoint of a system a human being may be regarded as a sort
of machine. But he must be something beyond machine, since he is supposed to have a unique
ability that the latter does not possess. For this reason, the image of mankind has been
constantly depicted as a meta-mechanical existence that surpasses machine itself, while only a
few human beings continue to pursue the ideal of humanity for their own existence as such.
From a rather diﬀerent angle we can also grasp the concept of human being. Under the
situation that a mass of messages are constantly created and contingently connected with one
another, it is increasingly diﬃcult for us human beings to maintain our normal social existence
and even social function as systems or machines. Nowadays, when the mass media as a source
of information and the telecommunication-network as a means of social communication have
constructed an enormous scale of information space, most people are obliged to accept a great
bulk of arbitrary messages. We can ordinarily observe such human behaviors as watching
television in the home to ﬁll the time, operating a computer according to the given rules, and
using a cellular phone or listening to music through earphones on a commuter train. From the
viewpoint of a system what does this pattern of life stand for? Every laborer in the oﬃce
catches and decodes external messages as input and receives a certain amount of wages as
output, but does not run any operation for its own sake. He may be a fairly malformed system,
since the range of his operation is mostly limited to the scale of his workshop. In other words,
he cannot properly fulﬁll his function as a system in oﬀ-hours, and his freedom from work may
often degenerate into lawlessness, debauchery or idleness. Although Marx generated the image
of a laborer who was treated inhumanly in a wretched workshop and was addicted to drinking,
going out for sex or gambling in oﬀ hours, his passionately animated narrative can be
embellished in a more reﬁned manner to explain moral decadence and the deterioration of
human beings. However, no group or ʻproletarianʼ class of deteriorated men and women can
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existing society!
Next we must make formally a conceptual comparison between machinery and system. For
that purpose we make use of the concept of a ʻfree machineʼ in which the word ʻfreeʼ does not
stand for ʻlibertyʼ, but an ʻuncontrolledʼ situation or a ʻlaissez- faireʼ state. If an ordinary human
life is identiﬁed with a sort of machinery production, this human-machine may be considered as
a waste-disposal plant. Such a change of our viewpoint allows us to conﬁrm that an unintended
input/output relationship prevails outside the original teleological structure of machinery. Thus a
ʻfree-machineʼ can be deﬁned as another machine that is dual to a given original machine.
Now it must be remembered that a concrete machine that carries out an actual productive
operation has a formal structure of an algebraic semigroup, while an abstract machinery that is
shown on the display of a computer has that of a group. Therefore, the latter can be regarded as
a reversible system or closed mechanism. Then what is the diﬀerence between machinery and
system as abstract and structural concepts? Certainly machinery is a kind of system, but system
is not always equal to machinery. Only a controllable and static (not dynamic) system can be
considered as machine. For example, the solar system is not a machine, since it cannot be
controlled by human power. Any machinery system must be regulated by direct or indirect
eﬀorts of mankind. Accordingly a nuclear weapon is a machine, since it is manufactured
through the technology of controlling a microscopic system of particles for the purpose of mass
murder. Thus the following equations can be derived:
machinery＝system＋controllability−dynamism, or
machine＋ʻfree machineʼ＝system−the property of dynamic equilibrium
As to a ʻfree machineʼ a few examples show its characteristics. First, any production
facilities may be a set of machines insofar as they reﬂect the intention of a controller(mankind).
But when they go beyond human control they are likely to be integrated to form a ʻwaste-
making operatorʼ that increases environmental pollution. Within a given total system this
independent ʻfree machineʼ produces the accumulation of output that may destroy the existing
social and natural systems appropriate to human life. Another kind of ʻfree machineʼ can be
operated with a certain type of socially malicious intent. A typical example is the computer
virus. It paralyses a computer system by means of its operator, and consequently carries on a
secret operation that is opposite to the negative feedback about a self-sustained control system.
The same type of ʻfree machineʼ can be found in a lawful action that may damage a legal
system, as many judicial precedents of criminal oﬀense suggest. Such a legal action often
denies the original social intention in a positive legal system, and then damages the common
f e e l i n go fc o n ﬁdence in the system itself. The rule of democracy as a social system may also
bring about a functional shift of itself toward that of the game for majority. These examples of
ʻfree machineʼ represent the self-negation or negative self-reference of a certain type of social
system. Notably, any scan-operator of a ʻvirusʼ (in fact, malicious persons) is not originally
installed in such a system. Rather it may be said that the system as a ʻfree-machineʼ can
continue to reproduce a combination of a ʻvirusʼ, an operator of defense against it and a more
harmful ʻresistant virusʼ.
On the basis of these concrete examples of ʻfree machineʼ one can consider another aspect
of social systems theory. There can be an internal factor (called a ʻself-denial factorʼ) that
negates a certain system through its own operator. Just as there is a proposition that is
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aﬃrmed by any logically possible operations, there always exists a ʻself-denial factorʼ that can
exert a destructive power over the entire self-referential system. Whenever such a ʻfactorʼ
emerges in a social system, it is often scanned and eliminated in the form of ʻrestructuringʼ,
rationalization or purging. If it spreads far and wide, social unrest may be caused and
sometimes a spontaneous social revolution occurs. On the contrary, another ʻfactorʼ may react
against a revolutionized social system and cause a counterrevolution. However, it is also
possible that an increase in the number of ʻself-denial factorsʼ does not bring about any dynamic
change in the social system. This is a case where a given social system has a tendency toward
corporationalizing or a Sisyphean self-reproduction. The ʻself-denial factorʼ that makes its
appearance there does not play a positive, deliberately destructive role, but serves the negative
function of system-preservation and cover-up of contradictions. It may cause a serious feeling
of entrapment among people within the system. In other words, its original teleological
structure will be broken down and the self-preservation of the system itself becomes its own
end.
Now we call into question how human nature emerges and operates in our mechanized
society. A human being can be regarded as a universal machine and therefore as a being that
has reason of various sorts. Technologically reasoning human power may be called imagination.
When we consider any object of our thinking as a structure or structural concept, we can deﬁne
imagination as the integrating ability to set up a new structure of given structures, or as the
continuously connecting ability in an autopoietic system. In a more intellectual sense it can also
be called recognizability with which man can recognize machinery as an external object and
operate it as a toy for children. Thus imagination or recognizability becomes the key indicator
of distinction between mankind and machinery. It allows men to achieve self-insight and self-
realization.
However, the evolution of mankind must be accompanied by its devolution as its
counterpart. It may be shown most remarkably in the historical process of industrial revolutions.
It seems that mankind has wasted its original recognizability and at last becomes a special-
purpose machine in that process. The exclusively mechanized nature of human beings has been
revealed in such persons as a civil servant who oﬀers a stereotyped solution according to
guidelines to his oﬃce (a law), a narrow-minded expert who thinks only of his extremely
specialist ﬁeld of study, and a conservative business person who follows a regular routine and
is not able to make any innovations. Perhaps we cannot reveal any means to prevent the
deterioration of recognizability, since a majority of our society will be increasingly formed by
unimaginative persons who function as special-purpose machines and at the same time the
appearance of men of great recognizability will tend to be a rare and accidental social
phenomenon. The latter type of mankind can only exist as a member of a social minority and
consequently may be destined to disappear into the twilight of the humanistic world.
Lastly we must refer to a ʻfree-manʼ in contrast with a ʻfree-machineʼ.Aʻfree-manʼ is
closely connected with the structure of play. There seem to be three distinct sorts of play. The
ﬁrst is an act of enjoying oneself that is opposed to serious work. The second represents
freedom of mental and physical activities. For example, thinking scientiﬁcally from a ʻvalue-
freeʼ standpoint means engaging in science as a play activity. The third type of play is a game
or social activity (Gesellschaftsspiel). If scientiﬁc activity is deﬁn e da sa na p p l i c a t i o no fr u l e s
(theories) to the object of research according to the requirements of a certain paradigm, science
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24. Especially pure science̶for example, mathematics or theoretical
physics̶can be a pure game, since it has no impure elements such as a pay-oﬀ function in
game theory. Here lies the diﬀerence between a game as play itself and an impure game. The
latter is under such external constraints on its players as the maximization of proﬁt and/or the
minimization of loss. These conditions enabled von Neumann to formalize a game
mathematically and to give it a teleological economic structure.
25 As a result he created the
strictly logical and therefore abstract concept of game. Thus an impure game has become an
abstract mathematical object that allows most economic theoreticians to play another kind of
game. It may be called a game of game, which means an academic competition for a new
model of economic game theory.
Generally speaking, play in a wide sense is a means by which everyone as a subject of
recognition can be conscious of oneself within the sphere of oneʼs own recognizability. The
term homo ludens that Johan Huizinga used in his famous book of the same title may reﬂect
such a view of human beings.
26 Since any play has the same structure as a ʻfree-machineʼ or
non-machine system, it may be considered as a system itself. Its operator is a rule of play or,
more restrictively, a rule of game, and its input and output include both man and nature. As the
play-system is increasingly mechanized, it will become an impure and abstract game that can
be played by machines or robots.
V
Finally we suggest a provisional and hypothetical schema concerning the relationship
between various economic systems of autopoietic character and the world capitalist system.
The simplest of these systems is originally that of an ʻeconomic manʼ or an entrepreneur of
European type, who was an educated, liberal and independent man of culture under the
inﬂuence of stoic Protestantism or Puritanism. Then, especially in the latter half of the 20th
century, the ʻeconomic manʼ became an ʻeconomic animalʼ under the regime of Asiatic and
ochlocratic groupism or ʻcapitalist totalitarianismʼ.T h eﬁttest type of capitalist operates an AP
system, and the most elementary key factor for providing various economic and economically
oriented organizations that also operate as autopoietic systems. These are themselves dynamic
allopoietic systems and construct a set of clopen sets that are directed and oriented by the
worldwide capitalist system. However, we must bear in mind that this global system is a
bordered physical object called the Earth, and therefore it is a ﬁnite, closed system. Naturally it
builds an absolute barrier to all movements of economic and non-economic AP systems.
Is there any way for an individual AP system to survive such a situation? Perhaps not.
Rather the worldwide transition from mutually exclusive, rigid AP systems to ʻautolysicʼ or
ʻapoptosicʼ systems may occur with surprising speed, and at the same time increase the ʻsocial
entropyʼ to the utmost limit. Moreover, as the number of ʻeconomic animalsʼ increases
everywhere on the Earth, a human being will become a ʻhuman animalʼ who, as a monstrous
AP system, lives only for the life of optimizing the satisfaction of his or her brutal desires for
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25 See, von Neumann (1928).
26 See, Huizinga (1938).physical and mental objects.
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